A Brief Historiography of U.S. Hegemony in the Cuban Sugar Industry by McCollum, Justin
Justin McCollum
3
A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF U.S. HEGEMONY IN THE CUBAN 
SUGAR INDUSTRY
By Justin McCollum
In July 1898 the United States entered the Cuban War for Independence, in 
which Cubans were fighting Spain for autonomy of the island. In December 
1898, Spain capitulated to the United States and signed the Treaty of Paris, 
which transferred sovereignty of Cuba to the United States. The formal mili-
tary occupation of Cuba by the United States began on 1 January 1899. The 
ensuing agreements established with Cuba gave the United States a position of 
hegemony on the island. This dominance manifested itself most thoroughly in 
Cuba’s sugar industry, which acted as the backbone of its economy.
 This historiographical essay maintains that the historical record of Cuba 
has been greatly shaped by the Cuban natural environment, specifically the 
island’s propensity to support sugarcane. This paper will focus on the effects of 
the U.S. hegemony in the Cuban sugar industry; of particular interest will be 
the ability of the U.S. sugar hegemony to create an atmosphere that was par-
ticularly susceptible to the revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro. The 
Cuban scholars analyzed in this paper highlight different historical phenom-
ena and their relationships to Cuba’s natural environment. Regardless of the 
specifics of the topic each scholar examines, it will become clear that Cuba’s 
natural environment heavily influenced its history.
the forum
4
1Ramiro Guerra Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean: An Economic History of Cuban 
Agriculture (New Haven, 1964), 67-74, 159; Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United 
States: A Brief History (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), 115-152
2Langley, 137.
The general trend of Cuban historiography accentuates the role of U.S. 
capitalists as they took advantage of the war-torn island, bought up cheap 
sugar capital, forced peasants from their land, and imposed a heightened level 
of capitalism on Cuban society. During the period of U.S. hegemony, Cuba 
witnessed the destruction of peasant communities due to the expansion of 
sugar plantations (latifundios), and the creation of new social classes which 
resulted from technological changes that barred Cuban planters access to nec-
essary and expensive capital. Consequently, Cuba’s export-oriented monocul-
ture economy became dependent on both foreign capital and high sugar prices 
in the global market, and the United States used its position as both Cuba’s 
primary capital investor and sugar consumer to leverage Cuban politics.
In the late 1960s, after Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuban scholars Ramiro 
Guerra Sanchez and Lester D. Langley studied the effects of Cuban sugar 
on the revolutionary movement and initiated what will be referred to as the 
“orthodox” view. They agree that the destruction of the Cuban general econ-
omy, its sugar-related capital and infrastructure, and the economic ruin of the 
planter class during the War for Independence necessitated imported capital 
to revive the country. However, they acknowledge that U.S. investors and cor-
porations were reluctant to pour such capital into the island’s sugar industry 
until favorable trade agreements were secured and risk was limited.1
These “favorable trade agreements” caused an immediate surge of U.S. 
capital into the Cuban sugar industry. The first such agreement, the Platt 
Amendment, essentially gave the United States carte blanche to interfere in 
Cuban affairs when it determined that Cuba’s security, political stability, or 
ability to protect property was at risk. The Platt Amendment essentially al-
lowed the U.S. to control Cuba. United States investment was accelerated 
by passage of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1903, which reduced tariffs on goods 
exchanged between the two countries—most specifically, Cuba’s import tariffs 
(paid to the U.S.) would be credited twenty percent of the sugar it exported 
to the U.S. Langley argues that other than the guarantee of a sugar market, 
“Cuban sugar producers benefited little financially by the twenty percent pref-
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erential duty, for the preference merely encouraged more capital investment 
in sugar production.”2  However, both authors agree that the law originated 
solely to benefit U.S. interests, as capital imported into Cuba was credited for-
ty percent of the duty fee. Langley also notes that the U.S. rush to profit from 
the Cuban landscape resembled two persistent themes of U.S. frontier expan-
sion:  the paternalistic view that Cubans were incapable of governing their 
own country; and the notion that Cuban land was underutilized and would 
only achieve its full God-given potential through the influx of U.S. capital.3
Culminating this orthodox view, Guerra Sanchez argues that Cubans 
were pushed into virtual serfdom as they became vassals of U.S. sugar inter-
ests. The majority of Cubans’ displeasure with their socioeconomic predica-
ment resulting from the period of U.S. sugar hegemony, coupled with the 
long-term degradation of the Cuban environment from extensive crop har-
vests, allowed Cuban peasants to be easily swayed by Castro’s anti-U.S. and 
anti-Batista rhetoric during the revolution.4
In the 1970s this orthodox view was examined, and more environmen-
tally-related historical contingencies were exposed. Robert B. Hoernel studies 
the reasons why U.S. sugar barons chose eastern Cuba as the focal point of 
their investment. His extremely thorough investigation begins by examining 
the general history of the island. During initial Spanish occupation, Santiago 
and Havana were separated by 700 miles of thickly vegetated, thinly populat-
ed terrain that was bisected by mountain ranges, swamps, and desert-like sa-
vannahs. Consequently, the only practical communication and transport link 
between the two regions was the sea. But this route flowed only one-way, from 
Santiago (east) to Havana (west), due to the combined effects of the Northeast 
Trades and the Gulf Stream, which made easting along either coast impracti-
cal and unreliable until the invention of the steamship. Additionally, Havana’s 
location near the Florida Straits made it a logical choice as the rendezvous 
point for Spain’s annual flotillas en route to Seville. Thus, Havana’s population 
and economy boomed, and the metropolis catalyzed western Cuba’s evolution 
as an export-oriented agricultural region. During the last century-and-a-half 
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under the Spanish crown, “western Cuba became a comparatively cosmopoli-
tan an dynamic society facing Europe and the Untied States, while the eastern 
population, as a result of geography, remained isolated, homogeneous, and 
parochial, and it faced the Caribbean.”5  The relatively isolated and undesir-
able land of eastern Cuba drove real estate prices down. When U.S. investors 
looked to initiate large-scale sugar plantations, the price was right in the east.
Hoernel also notes that the biology of sugarcane itself played an im-
portant role in the reorganization of the Cuban landscape. The plant requires 
milling within twenty four hours of harvesting, as evaporation and enzymatic 
degradation of the sucrose rapidly diminishes its sugar content. Consequent-
ly, U.S. capitalists centrally-located their enormous sugar mills (“centrales”) 
amongst the cane fields, and sought to control cane production in the sur-
rounding areas. Many cane farmers who previously owned their lands be-
came tenants (“colonos”) and farmed corporate land. As colonos transferred 
their cane to the centrales, “they lost much of their independence and became 
bound to the mills” and to the market price of sugar. This system gave U.S. 
capitalists the means to secure access to cane while transferring some of the 
risk to the cane farmers.6
Hoernel acknowledges that as U.S. investors gained confidence in their 
nation’s ability to protect their investments, the scale of development in eastern 
Cuba surged. He argues that, partially due to the Reciprocity Treaty (1903), 
it was cheaper for U.S. capitalists to buy relatively undeveloped land in east-
ern Cuba and import new machinery than it was to buy and improve exist-
ing mills in western Cuba. The United Fruit Company, for example, bought 
200,000 acres in 1902 (for two dollars per acre), and 180,000 acres in 1904 in 
eastern Cuba. Additionally, U.S. capitalists bought out many Cuban planters 
whom had previously ground their own cane using older and cheaper machin-
ery.7  Consequently, the number of small farmers was cut in half, and the sugar 
latifundias quickly assumed the largest percentage of eastern Cuba’s land. As 
a result, many small farmers were forced off their land and moved their op-
erations either farther inland or on to mountainsides. In each instance, they 
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would clear existing vegetation and increase the natural pace of erosion. Also, 
the exodus of small farmers onto steeper land dictated the types of crops these 
farmers pursued. Many of these farmers turned to the stigmatized crops of the 
poor and oppressed—coffee and cocoa. Hoernel implies that this new social 
identification fostered a deep resentment of the U.S. in particular and capital-
ists in general that made the Castro Revolution more feasible.8
The demand for labor in eastern Cuba during the harvest (“zafra”) was 
greater than the local population could supply. Thus, non-white immigrant 
workers poured in from all over the Caribbean. Hoernel argues that it was 
ultimately because of the new labor requirements from the U.S. expansion of 
the Cuban sugar industry that caused the white, landed Cuban elite to cam-
paign for a ban on non-white immigration. Their efforts came to fruition in 
1910 through Military Order No. 155. In 1913, the Cuban government even 
offered a five dollar stipend for every white person imported from Panama to 
increase the white population. Eventually, however, the demand for workers 
outpaced white immigration, and non-whites were permitted entry. Thus, the 
demographics of eastern Cuba were forever changed due to sugarcane.
It is here that Hoernel blames U.S. capitalists for the degradation of a 
once rich Afro-Cuban culture in eastern Cuba. The influx of zafra workers 
made eastern Cuba the most populous part of the island. The rise of U.S. lati-
fundias and the extent of the population increase, a large proportion of which 
was alien, severely changed the region’s society, culture, and economy. In no 
more than twenty years, a regional society of “largely self-sufficient farmers, 
was transformed into one of highly dependent farm laborers working for pre-
dominately foreign corporations, eating foreign-produced foods, often living 
in company towns, and buying from company stores.”9 The seasonal zafra 
workers brought with them strange languages, religions, and customs that dis-
rupted eastern Afro-Cuban society. When the price of sugar dropped, many 
workers were laid off, and native Cubans found themselves competing with 
immigrants for jobs. As a result, many absconded to relatively isolated and un-
developed regions in search of land upon which to squat, clear, and cultivate. 
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These actions further disturbed Cuba’s natural environment and left a bitter 
taste of capitalism behind.10
Conversely, when the price of sugar boomed during World War I and 
the 1920s, largely a result of the destruction of competition from the Euro-
pean sugar beet industry due to the war, prosperity was to be found in all 
of Cuba’s sugar regions. However, the rapidly-expanding population strained 
eastern Cuba’s public services as it caused change and friction among lower 
socioeconomic groups. The culture that once stressed morality and individual-
ity morphed into an increasingly impersonal and amoral way of life as eastern 
Cubans converted to consumerism. Additionally, the increase in population 
due to zafra workers was disproportionately male, which led to a situation that 
fostered vice, violence, rape, and prostitution (Hoernel also lists a dispropor-
tionately high level of homosexuality in eastern Cuba as a result of the zafra 
influx). In fact, Hoernel traces Cuba’s contemporary reputation as a land of 
heightened promiscuity to this “cultural breakdown.”11
Jules Robert Benjamin, writing at the same time as Hoernel, generally 
agrees with Hoernel, but introduces several different environmentally-related 
historical contingencies that affected the Cuban sugar industry. Benjamin ar-
gues that because Cuba’s independence came at the time when U.S. capitalists 
were forming large trusts, investment in the industry followed the U.S. pat-
tern of monopolies. This model of investment allowed for a complete domi-
nation of the industry, which accelerated both the spread of poverty and the 
alteration of the natural Cuban landscape.12
Benjamin also agrees with Langley’s and Guerra Sanchez’s interpretation 
of the Reciprocity Treaty directly benefiting U.S. capitalists more than Cu-
bans,  but notes that the Reciprocity Treaty probably would not have passed 
the U.S. Congress without President Theodore Roosevelt’s insistence. Roos-
evelt’s experience as a Rough Rider in Cuba’s War for Independence gener-
ated a sense of personal attachment to the country. Thus, although Roosevelt 
generally favored agricultural protection, his connection with Cuba convinced 
Justin McCollum
9
13 Ibid., 10-12.
14 Ibid., 6.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 9,14-17.
17 Ibid., 62-63.
him that it was a special case, and he supported reciprocity. Benjamin notes 
that without the Reciprocity Treaty, Cubans would not have had a market for 
sugar, as the duty-free sugar from Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico 
would have out-competed Cuban sugar. 
Additionally, Benjamin argues that the continued U.S. presence in Cuba 
created resentment among most elements of the post-independence genera-
tion of Cubans, and their frustrations were taken out on a succession of Cu-
ban presidents. He explains that because “each Cuban president had to make 
his peace with the United States, none of them was able to avoid for very long 
the accusation of having betrayed the nation.”  Hence, pre-Castro Cuban gov-
ernments never achieved legitimacy, and were easy targets for disenchanted, 
revolutionary-minded Cubans. 
Finally, Benjamin argues that because of sugarcane’s seasonal nature, the 
Cuban economy ran on credit, which made banks even more influential insti-
tutions than usual. As the European sugar beet industry recovered after WWI 
and the price of sugar dropped, a sugar crash hit Cuba from 1920-1921. The 
low price of sugar caused inflation to soar, and U.S. banks capitalized on the 
situation. Fearing economic disaster, U.S. politicians pushed a banking bill 
through the Cuban Congress, the terms of which most Cuban banks could 
not meet. As a result, the largest banks in Cuba folded, and only four domes-
tic banks survived. With the sole exception of the Royal Bank of Canada, 
the vacuum was filled by U.S. banks. In the spirit of Cold War historians, 
Benjamin ends by implying that such U.S. domination of Cuba, springing 
from the sugar industry, proffered a negative view of capitalism throughout 
the island that led to Cuba’s socialist movement and, ultimately, the Cuban 
Communist Party. 
The end of the Cold War prompted a prodigious amount of publica-
tions on the Cuban sugar industry. Again, scholars pointed to environmental-
ly-related historical contingencies that severely impacted Cuba’s lively history. 
Jorge F. Perez-Lopez agrees with previous scholars that the plight of Cubans 
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due to the U.S. sugar hegemony fueled Castro’s revolution and provided it 
with thousands of peasant farmers from eastern Cuba. However, he argues 
that even though the U.S. essentially abandoned the industry during the Great 
Depression, the “Cubanization” of the economy did not culminate until after 
World War II—Cuba’s last real sugar boom. Thus, not only did the Cubans 
miss out on an exorbitant amount of profits, they remained dependent on 
U.S. capital, which prolonged the sense of dependency Cubans had felt since 
1898. Perez-Lopez argues that this frustration was coupled with a perception 
of U.S.-stimulated inequities that caused a serious urban-rural divide in Cu-
ban society on which Castro capitalized.18
In a beautiful display of microhistory, Mark Smith presents a case study 
of the U.S.-owned Central Manati, nearly four hundred miles east of Ha-
vana. He suggests that the data from this central can be generally  applied to 
eastern Cuba to better understand its early twentieth-century sugar industry. 
His study of bateys, villages and towns created for, or directly sustained by, 
the sugar industry, is fascinating. The scope of bateys were enormous—they 
contained living quarters for several thousand workers “who would be em-
ployed in and around the mill. Plans [also] called for stores, restaurants, a 
post office, hospital, theater, and school, all completed within a few years.”19 
He stresses that the majority of resources used to construct bateys came from 
the surrounding Cuban landscape. Palm trees were utilized for thatched-roof 
huts, cedar and mahogany were all harvested for more durable structures, and 
nearby forests were decimated of trees so that railroad ties could be obtained.20
Smith also argues that U.S. sugar hegemony changed the traditional Cu-
ban land tenure system so that the corporate acquisition of large tracts of land 
became possible. During the Spanish era, inherited land was held in common 
by various beneficiaries. Each inheritor held a proportion of the overall owner-
ship. Thus, large tracts of land became subdivided between many family mem-
bers. Cuban law did not allow this land to be sold unless all owners unani-
mously voted in favor of a sale. The rarity of such agreement was problematic 
for land-hungry sugar barons, so the U.S. military stepped in. Military Order 
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Number 62 divided the communal estates into privately-owned tracts which 
could be freely bought and sold. The sugar corporations took full advantage 
and bought up huge amounts of land.21
Another reason behind U.S. sugar hegemony, argues Richard P. Tucker, 
is a shift in consumer tastes. Perhaps reflecting racial undertones of the era, 
people in industrialized countries began to prefer highly refined white sugar. 
In order to produce such sugar, sugar refiners were forced to “adopt the fun-
damental [and capital-intensive] changes that were appearing in sugar refining 
technology, and this transformed the scale and quality of operations.”22  If 
consumer taste did not shift, then Cubans would have likely been able to re-
build their industry without (as much) U.S. capital, and the U.S. might never 
have gained a position of hegemony in the Cuban sugar industry.
Smith also focuses on the sheer destruction of the Cuban natural en-
vironment as a result of U.S. sugar hegemony. He repeatedly laments on in-
stances where U.S. capitalists slashed and burned forests to plant more cane. 
Sugar tycoons preferred dense forest lands for cane farming because the con-
stant breakdown of plant matter provided the soil with rich nutrients that 
resulted in faster growing cane. Ultimately, the once vast and seemingly im-
penetrable forests of Cuba became marginalized and only remained on various 
hillside patches.23
Alan Dye unearths another ecologically-significant factor of Cuban 
sugar production. “Ratoons” were plants that had sprouted from previously 
harvested cane. Cane, being a perennial crop, will grow throughout the year. 
Thus, it is possible to harvest ratoons in subsequent years, which saves labor 
by avoiding the need to plant a whole new crop. Generally, ratoons are only 
harvested in extremely fertile soils, the best of which usually allowed for three 
consecutive (annual) crops to be harvested from the original plant. In Cuba, 
however, soil fertility allowed for as many as thirty consecutive harvests to 
occur before replanting. U.S. sugar tycoons saved a tremendous amount of 
capital by keeping labor costs down, and this capital could be reinvested in the 
form of adding more Cuban land to their operations.24
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An added ecological determinate in the success of the Cuban sugar in-
dustry came in the form of a plant virus—mosaic disease. Stuart McCook ar-
gues that although mosaic disease was virtually ignored during the era of U.S. 
sugar hegemony, it devastated the industry’s future on the island. Researchers 
discovered mosaic in Cuban sugarcane during the World War I sugar boom, 
but as immediate losses from the virus are minimal, it was disregarded. The 
mosaic virus does not immediately kill the Crystalina cane, the predominant 
variety cultivated in Cuba. However, mosaic does make the cane more sus-
ceptible to death from secondary causes, such as more readily succumbing to 
drought or easily uprooting when exposed to high winds (due to a weaker root 
system). Finally, mosaic stunted the growth of Crystalina cane and required 
frequent replanting due to deterioration of the plant. The economic factor of 
smaller crops and increased labor translated to higher operational costs which 
proved too much for Cubans to effectively surmount once U.S. sugar hege-
mony ended. Thus, Cuban production faltered, the economy deteriorated, 
and a large class of poverty-stricken farmers became ripe for Castro’s picking. 
 This fascinating historiography exposes the importance of environ-
mentally-related historical contingencies in Cuban history. United States he-
gemony in Cuban sugar undoubtedly put a permanent mark on the island’s 
history, and will likely continue to shape its future development. However, 
although most historians brushed over the effects that sugar had on the de-
velopment of Cuban railroads, none gave the issue an appropriate amount of 
attention. As the great environmental historian Willaim Cronon portrays in 
his work, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, railroads have the 
potential to provoke monumental change of an area’s landscape, and thus its 
history. A further area of study lacking in this historiography is the relatively 
sparsely populated southern coast of Cuba around the port of Trinidad. Lo-
cated in the middle of the island, this region was undoubtedly influenced by 
both Cuba’s eastern and western sugar culture, and played a hefty role in the 
industry. A thorough assessment of these topics would sweeten the history of 
Cuba.
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